A new lens on trust, governance, and efficiency through game theory.
Public goods, like clean water, infrastructure, and social services, are essential, but their provision is often marred by inefficiencies. My doctoral research investigates a lesser-known but powerful concept: the vertical dilemma, which describes the trust-based tension between authorities and the public in hierarchical systems. This dilemma often leads to coordination failures, poor service delivery, and mistrust, especially in resource-scarce or socio-politically complex environments.
This research brings together ideas from game theory, behavioral economics, and public policy to build a model that helps explain—and potentially resolve—this persistent governance challenge.
The vertical dilemma is a theoretical concept that captures the misalignment of interests and trust between different levels of hierarchy: typically government (or management) and the public (or employees). Unlike the classic prisoner's dilemma which occurs between equals, the vertical dilemma arises across levels, with power, information asymmetry, and incentives complicating cooperation.
Think of it like this:
The government may hesitate to invest heavily in public goods fearing misuse or non-cooperation.
Citizens, seeing limited commitment or benefits, withdraw cooperation; resisting taxes, rules, or usage norms.
Both sides expect failure from the other, and act accordingly.
This cycle perpetuates inefficiency, breeds mistrust, and reinforces governance challenges.
My thesis investigates how this vertical dilemma plays out in public water provision in India, a setting with rich data, diverse actors, and complex governance layers. Using game-theoretic modeling, I explore how trust, power, and incentives influence public service outcomes.
Key questions include:
Can the vertical dilemma be modeled mathematically to predict failures or cooperation?
How do hierarchy, trust, and social context influence public behavior?
Is this dilemma universal across services and sectors?
This research seeks to go beyond theory, toward solutions.
Efficient delivery of public goods is essential for equitable development, especially in emerging economies. Understanding vertical dilemmas can:
Help design better public policies and incentive structures
Improve government-citizen trust
Provide insight into organizational or corporate governance where similar dynamics play out
As global challenges like climate change and urbanization stress public systems, building frameworks that promote collaborative efficiency is more urgent than ev
My work explores how product decisions are shaped in real organizational contexts, combining academic rigor with practical product challenges.
The research involved qualitative and quantitative analysis, practitioner insights, and applied frameworks relevant to product strategy, innovation, and organizational decision-making.
Full findings and detailed data are shared within the limits of institutional agreements.
This research investigates the “Vertical Dilemma” in the efficient provision of public goods, a phenomenon that arises when information asymmetry, trust deficits, and misaligned incentives reduce cooperation between public administrators and citizens. The study explores how governance efficiency and citizen participation interact to influence collective welfare outcomes.
Drawing on game theory and behavioral economics, the dissertation develops the Vertical Dilemma Index (VDI), a conceptual and simulation-based framework to measure the degree of alignment between public and governmental actions. The research employs a mixed-method approach, combining quantitative analysis through surveys of government and citizen groups with qualitative simulation modeling. Statistical techniques, including t-tests, chi-square tests, and regression analysis, are used to evaluate trust, transparency, communication, and feedback as determinants of effective governance.
Findings indicate that higher transparency and inclusive feedback mechanisms significantly enhance trust and cooperation between citizens and institutions. The simulation results demonstrate that the VDI can serve as an operational tool to predict and mitigate inefficiencies in public service delivery by identifying points of misalignment.
The study contributes both theoretically and practically: it extends the application of game-theoretic reasoning to public management, and it offers policymakers a framework for quantifying vertical collaboration gaps. Policy implications emphasize designing accountability structures and participatory governance models that strengthen trust-based interactions.
Policymakers and executives can use it to anticipate cooperation breakdowns, design credible interventions, and institutionalize transparency as a measurable performance asset.
Keywords: Vertical Dilemma, Public Goods, Governance Efficiency, Transparency, Trust, Game Theory, Public Administration